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PROVIDING PROPER PREPARATION:
ACHIEVING ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY
FOR FOSTER YOUTH
FARRAH CHAMPAGNE1
PART I: INTRODUCTION
When Sherry T.2 was 14 years old, the police removed her from her
mother’s home. Sherry was in tenth grade at the time, and as a result of her
displacement she dropped out of high school. Over the next year and a
half, she slept outside, in abandoned homes, and in the homes of strangers.
She had no money and no food, and did what she had to do in order to
survive. One winter night, she was alone and had nowhere to go. She
became so desperate that she caused a ruckus at a shopping center and
purposely got arrested just so she would have a warm place to sleep that
night. At the time, she did not care whether the police locked her up
indefinitely because at least she would have food to eat, a place to sleep,
and clothes to wear.
The next morning, she was taken to a homeless shelter where she
enrolled in an alternative school. The conditions were so rough at the
school that she quit after about two weeks, and decided to take the General
Educational Development Test (G.E.D). At the time, she was just fifteen
and a half years old. After obtaining her G.E.D., she enrolled in the
cosmetology school that was down the street from the transitional
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placement she had been moved to. While she was living in the transitional
placement, she received very little guidance from the staff members about
how to budget, pay bills, or maintain steady employment, and soon after
her eighteenth birthday she was forced to move out. She had an extremely
difficult time even though she had a job because she did not know how to
maintain her housing or employment. After about six months, her landlord
told her that she would have to move because she could not pay the rent.
Since she did not have enough money saved to get an apartment she
became homeless again.
Sherry’s story is not uncommon. Many foster youth receive little to no
instruction about how to survive in the adult world, and as a result many of
them face a losing battle and become homeless adults.3 It is unreasonable to
expect youths to attain perfect independence at age eighteen, when the
average age of independence in America is twenty-six years of age.4 This
Comment argues that foster youths have a substantive due process right to
receive emancipation preparation services designed to prepare them for
independent living and to prevent future homelessness.
This paper consists of nine parts. In Part II, I provide an overview of a
foster youth’s life after aging out of the foster care system. Part II argues
that serious problems occur in the lives of foster youth because they often
leave care without having been provided, by their state appointed
caregivers, the necessary resources to enable them to succeed. In Part III, I
argue that courts should establish a ‘right to treatment’ for foster youth.
Part III also argues that the state is responsible for offering foster youth
emancipation preparation services and should be held liable if they fail to
do so. In Part IV, I outline the substantive due process rights afforded to
foster youth. In Part V, I compare the standard of deliberate indifference to
the standard of professional judgment when establishing liability under
Section 1983 for a violation of a foster youth’s substantive due process
rights. In Part V, I argue that the professional judgment standard is more
appropriate then the deliberate indifference standard as applied in the foster
care context. In Part VI, I highlight the dangers of distinguishing between
voluntarily and involuntarily placed foster children as they relate to
standards of protection from harm in the eyes of the court. In Part VII, I
explain three litigation strategies that foster youth can utilize when bringing
causes of action against state actors. Finally, in Part VIII, I provide
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See Miriam Aroni Krinsky, A Not So Happy Birthday: The Foster Youth Transition
from Adolescence into Adulthood, 48 Fam. Ct. Rev. 250 (2010)(explaining that former
foster youth are expected to become fully self-sufficient by the age of eighteen
although the average age of financial independence in the U.S. is twenty-six).
4
Id. (claiming that when foster youth falter, there is no one there to support them).
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recommendations that can be implemented by legislative bodies to better
serve the career and personal development needs of foster youth.
PART II: THE PERILS OF UNPREPARED EMANCIPATION
There are five major reasons that youth become involved in the foster
care system: neglect or abuse, mental illness in the parent, the child’s
emotional issues, illness or incapacity of the parent, and family problems.5
There are four types of placements for foster youth: basic foster care,
therapeutic foster care, institutional care or residential treatment, and
psychiatric hospitalization.6 Instead of going into a traditional placement,
some youth may choose to move in with a relative. Nevertheless, the
caregivers at shelters and foster homes often provide foster youth with
basic necessities such as food, clothing, and a bed, but they rarely provide
the youth with the necessary tools and strategies for adult living.7 Once the
children reach the age of eighteen, they “age out” of the system and are
expected to provide for all of their needs including, rent, food,
transportation, clothing, and other living expenses.8
According to the United States Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and
Reporting System (AFCARS) there were 400,540 children in foster care on
September 30, 2011.9 AFCARS also reported that 245,260 children exited
foster care during fiscal year 2011, and 26,286 were emancipated that
year.10 Many of these youth do not have parents who will offer the support
they need to maintain their housing, thus they often become homeless or
resort to self-destructive means of survival.

5

See Mary Ann Davis, The Development of Persistent Criminality, 233 (Joanne
Savage eds., 2009)(explaining that vulnerable foster youth sometimes need to be place
out of their homes as a means of protection from their family or caretakers).
6
Id.
7
See May Shin, A Saving Grace? The Impact of the Fostering Connections to
Success and Increasing Adoptions Act on America's Older Foster Youth, 9 Hastings
Race & Poverty L. J. 133, 134 (2012)(stating that most children who leave the foster
care system are not well prepared to live independently).
8
See Davis, supra note 4, at 233 (stating that non-foster care youth in the United
States are dependent through college)..
9
See U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Admin. for Child. & Fams., Admin. on
Child., Youth & Fams., Child. Bureau, The AFCARS Report, Preliminary FY 2011
Estimates as of June 2012, Rep. 19 (2012) [hereinafter AFCARS Report 19], available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/main/afcarsreport19.pdf.
10
Id.
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Foster youth face significant challenges in their quest to obtain gainful
employment when they emancipate from the foster care system. These
problems occur because the youth often leave foster care without the
necessary resources and skills to enable them to be productive in society.11
The high unemployment rates among foster youth are compounded by
problems faced when they attempt to gain adequate education and
independent living skills.12 For example, the average seventeen-year old
foster youth reads at a seventh grade level, making it very likely that she
will not graduate from high school.13 This lack of education can lead to
homelessness shortly after aging out of the foster care system. In fact,
many emancipated foster youth who have not received adequate
emancipation preparation services turn to prostitution, drug dealing, and
crimes of desperation just to survive.14

A.High Unemployment Rates
Many youth who emancipate from the foster care system find themselves
unable to perform as productive members of society because they often
lack the necessary skills, experience, knowledge and support systems.15
Without this support, foster youth face enormous economic challenges.
The main step toward economic self-sufficiency is obtaining a stable form
of employment.16 Not only do former foster youth have to obtain and
retain employment, they also need to pay a security deposit for an
apartment, have good credit, obtain furniture, and pay monthly rent. It is
not surprising then that many of the eighteen year olds who have been
forced into emancipation by the foster care system often lack stable
incomes and housing.17 Statistics show that former foster care youth fair
11

Id.
Id.
13
See Katherine M. Swift, A Child's Right: What Should the State Be Required to
Provide to Teenagers Aging Out of Foster Care? 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1205,
1207 (2007) (citing Mark E. Courtney et al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult
Functioning of Former Foster Youth: Conditions of Youth Preparing to Leave State
Care (2004)).
14
See Kevin M. Ryan, Stemming the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: a Due Process
Perspective, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 271, 276 - 277 (1993)(stating that many runaways
“succumb to a life of chronic indigence, ensnared by long-term homelessness and
poverty”).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See e.g. Allison Henig, Employment Aid for Youth Aging Out of Foster Care:
Extending One-Stop Career Centers to Include A Division for Foster Care Youth, 47
12
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poorly after emancipation in the realm of employment.18 In addition, youth
who are unemployed tend to lack the necessary skills to develop an
employment track record, which can lead to them earning a lower living
wage over their working lives.19 A high rate of unemployment in former
foster youth negatively affects communities and economic prosperity.20
Foster youth who obtain employment often receive low wages, leaving
them below the federal poverty level.21 As a result, many rely on public
assistance to meet their needs, which is not a cure for the long-term
problem.22 If foster youth learn how to become self-sufficient, there would
not be as much of a need for government assistance.23 A national survey
revealed that only 38% of former foster youth were employed for one year
after leaving the foster care system.24 This survey needs to be viewed by
comparing societal norms in the United States where our society does not
expect youth to be fully independent at the age of eighteen.25 For example,
the United States Census Bureau found that in 2011, 29,641,000 youth who

Fam. Ct. Rev. 570, 572 (2009)(concluding that many youth do not have the knowledge,
experience, habits, and relationships that will provide the necessary support for them to
be productive members of society).
18
See Scott Hollander, Jonathan Budd, William A. Petulla, Jennifer A. Staley,
Helping Clients Transition to Independent Living, 45 Fam. Ct. Rev. 444 (2007); see
also Child Welfare League of America, Child Welfare: Youth After Foster Care,
available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/fostercare/factsheetafter.htm (last visited
Dec. 14, 2013).
19
See Dorcas R. Gilmore, Youth Entrepreneurship Legal Services: A Model for
Helping Youths Create Their Own Jobs, 43 Clearinghouse Rev. J. of Poverty L. &
Pol'y 37 (May-June 2009)(claiming that youth unemployment negatively affects
society as a whole).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See Susan Bennett, Heartbreak Hotel: The Disharmonious Convergence of
Welfare, Housing and Homelessness, 1 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 27, 34 (1990)
(claiming that welfare benefits are a short-term fix for a long-term problem that cannot
be simply cured with emergency funding).
23
See id.
24
Child Welfare League of America, Child Welfare: Youth After Foster Care,
available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/fostercare/factsheetafter.htm (last visited
Dec. 14, 2013).
25
U.S. Census, Current Population Survey, Young Adults Living At Home: 1960 to
Present, tbl. AD-1 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hhfam/ad1.xls.
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were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four were living in
households with older adults rather than independently; 58.9% of the males
and 50.2% of the females were living with their parents.26 The failure of
our society to recognize the economic difficulties facing former foster
youth and provide them with proper preparation for emancipation may be
part of the cause of the difficulty that foster youth face when they age out
of foster care.

B.Low Educational Achievement
The concept of what constitutes a level of education necessary for
success in today’s competitive world has changed. At one time a high
school diploma was enough to guarantee a person’s success as an adult, but
today it is necessary to obtain some form of post-secondary education. The
more education a person obtains, the more financial stability she has.27
Workers today have few job prospects if they only have a high school
diploma, and as necessary education levels rise, those who do not keep
pace will be left behind. Foster teens are at especially high risk because
they cannot depend on family members to support them financially if they
cannot obtain employment. In order for a former foster youth to gain
employment, she must have academic skills; unfortunately fewer than half
of former foster youth have graduated from high school.28
This low educational achievement can partly be attributed to the
relocation that happens when youth are placed in foster care. Youth who
are placed out of their homes are often deprived of the permanence that
would assist them in completing their education. This leads to low
graduation rates and places former foster youth at a distinct disadvantage
when it comes to employment possibilities.29 The inability to compete with
job candidates who have high school diplomas and college degrees leaves
many former foster youth out on a limb when it comes to maintaining fully
functional independent living.
26

Id.
See Michele M. Benedetto, The Key to Successful Independence: State-Funded
Post-Secondary Educational Assistance for Emancipated Foster Youth, 23 St. John's J.
Legal Comment. 383, 392 (2008)(stating that two people in a household who earn
minimum wage make far less yearly income than the current median, and that those
low wages make it nearly impossible to maintain financial independence)..
28
See Shin, supra note 7, at 139(claiming that low high school graduation rates work
against former foster youth, especially when they attempt to compete for jobs against
high school and college graduates).
29
See id.(claiming that high unemployment rates are worsened by the challenges
foster youth face when they attempt to gain education and necessary life skills).
27
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The government has a duty to protect foster youth from harm when they
are in the state’s custody and this includes properly preparing them for
adulthood.30 The state’s responsibility to provide emancipation preparation
services should include offering foster youth post-secondary educational
opportunities. To become fully functioning productive members of society,
foster youth must have access to institutions of higher education or
vocational programs. This includes state provisions of necessary financial
resources.
It is recognized that housing is essential for independent living, but
without the means to pay rent, there will be no housing. Foster youth need
job skills, and in order to gain job skills, they need education. The problem,
however, is that higher education is expensive and former foster youth are
unlikely to have the resources to be able to afford college or a vocational
training program. Since foster youth cannot count on the support of family
members, they should be able to obtain funding from the state, which has
been appointed to serve as a parental figure. Foster youth would develop
positively if states would strongly support their educational needs.

C.Poverty
Low-wage jobs can lead to poverty; poverty can lead to homelessness.
Foster youth do not have a financial support network, unlike the many who
have never lived in the foster care system.31 Studies show that within a
two-year period, 40-50% of former foster youth become homeless.32 There
is a strong correlation between foster care and homelessness; a national
survey reported that 25% of former foster youth became homeless for at
least one night within four years of emancipation.33 According to another
study, 27% of the adult homeless population in New York and Los Angeles
were former foster care youth.34 In California, as of April 2011, there were
more homeless former foster children than war veterans in the state’s
30

See id.
See id. at 141.
32
Chapter VI: Life after Foster Care, Juvenile Justice in California Part II:
Dependency System, League of Women Voters of Cal. (July 1998), available at
http://www.ca.lwv.org/jjds/chap6.html (stating that the respondents in his study were
not able to buy food or pay bills).
33
Child Welfare League of America, Child Welfare: Youth After Foster Care,
available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/fostercare/factsheetafter.htm (last visited
April 13, 2013)(stating that three in ten homeless adults report that they were former
foster care youth).
34
Id. (showing that seventy percent of former foster youth wanted to attend college).
31
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homeless shelters.35 Many of these youth became homeless when they
“aged out” of the foster care system at the tender age of eighteen.
It is unrealistic to expect youth who have suffered from abuse and
neglect to have workable independent living skills at the age of eighteen.36
Independent living skills assist youth in achieving and maintaining
economic self-sufficiency, but these skills are not enough to ensure
successful emancipation.37 Along with independent living skills, former
foster youth need support networks and relationships with family, friends,
colleagues, and other adults. Interdependence is what is necessary, and this
combination of skills and support networks is what leads to high quality
independent living.38
Achieving workable interdependency requires
planning for emancipation by assessing and acquiring networks for
potential resources including relatives, mentors, members of religious
organizations, and foster parents.39 Foster youth need others who can help
them advance economically.40
Very few of us would allow our eighteen-year-old child to move out of
our home with no job, no money, no home, and no life skills. Many of us
on the other hand would assist her when the inevitable difficulties of life
fell upon her. Yet former foster youth who have often suffered abuse and
neglect are abandoned and left to face the harsh realities of adult life
without any help.41 Former foster youth on average earn $6,000 or less per

35

Amita Sharma, Many Penniless Foster Kids Call the Streets Home (KPBS
Evening
Edition
radio
broadcast
Apr.
6,
2011),
available
at
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/apr/06/many-penniless-former-foster-kids-make-callstreet/(claiming that “reform requires influence” and there are very few lobbyists in
Sacramento who advocate for foster youth, thus many of them fall through the cracks).
36
UCLA Sch. of Soc. Welfare Ctr. for Child and Family Policy Studies, AGING
OUT OF FOSTER CARE: L.A. County’s Indep. Living Program, Final Report Year 1,
Rep. 3, 22 (1988)(arguing that the notion of independent living for eighteen-year olds
is unrealistic).
37
Id (stating that the notion of independent eighteen-year olds is unrealistic,
especially for children who have been victims of abuse or neglect or who have spent
time in foster care).
38
Id. at 23(asserting that concrete skill-building can help achieve interdependence).
39
Id. (arguing that the focus should be on interdependence rather than
independence).
40
See Susan D. Bennett, Creating A Client Consortium: Building Social Capital,
Bridging Structural Holes, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 67, 101 (2006) (asserting that
community clients need to build connections within their communities in order to
advance economically and socially).
41
See Krinsky, supra note 3, at 251.
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year; they lack independent living skills; only one-third have driver’s
licenses; fewer than half have $250 in cash; and fewer than a fourth of
them have the skills to set up and maintain a household.42 When society
fails to properly prepare foster youth for emancipation, it creates tragedies
in the lives of the youth who then are more likely to become homeless soon
after leaving the foster care system. With just a smattering of knowledge
about life in the real world, many former foster youth find themselves alone
at the tender age of eighteen, desperate for survival.

D.Crimes of Desperation
Foster youth are more likely to engage in criminal activity than youth
who were not involved in the system.43 When foster youth “age out” of the
system they are at a high risk of becoming involved with crime.44 Studies
show that foster youth were more likely to report that they damaged
property, stole something that was worth more than $50, participated in a
group fight, and pulled a knife or a gun on someone.45 This high rate of
criminal behavior is of particular concern because of the negative

42

See Jose-Luis Mejia, Glenn Eagleson & Justin Slaughter, Honoring Emancipated
Youth, Barriers Facing Foster Youth: National and Local Statistics Around
Emancipating
Foster
Youth,
http://yesyous.com/static/files/0266e33d3f546cb5436a10798e657d97/1335227502/Fost
erYouthStatistics.pdf (last visited April 13, 2013); see also Peter J. Pecora et al.,
Improving Family Foster Care: Findings From the Northwest Foster Care Alumni
Study
(2005),
available
at
http://www.casey.org/Resources/Publications/pdf/ImprovingFamilyFosterCare_FR.pdf.
(last visited April 13, 2013); see also Robert M. George et al., University of Chicago,
Chapin Hall Center for Children, Employment Outcomes for Youth Aging Out of
Foster Care (2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/fostercare-agingout02 (last
visited April 13, 2013).
43
See Shin, supra note 7, at 141(asserting that foster youth are incarcerated more
often because “judges perceive their lack of caregiver representation as an indication
that the youth[s] are less stable and less supervised than their non-foster peers.”).
44
Id. (stating that one in four foster youth who age out of foster care will be
incarcerated within the first two years of emancipation.
45
Offending During Late Adolescence: How Do Youth Aging Out Of Care Compare
With
Their
Peers?
Chapin
Hall
1,
6
(2007),
available
at
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/publications/ChapinHallDocument_0.pdf
(last visited April 13, 2013).
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correlation between criminal history and obtainment of employment.46
Studies show that people who were formerly incarcerated work less and
earn less than those who were not incarcerated.47 Even when foster youths
obtain employment, they often have difficulty retaining the job. Thus, they
often elect to earn a considerable amount of their income from outside of
the legal economy.48 One study showed that former foster youth sometimes
resort to illegal means in order to support themselves, including drug
dealing and prostitution.49
Youth who become homeless or who are at risk of becoming homeless
sometimes engage in survival sex, which is the “selling of sex to meet
subsistence needs.”50 Homeless boys and girls constitute the highest
represented population of prostitutes, engaging in survival sex to get
shelter, food, drugs, or money.51 This results in an extremely high rate of
HIV infections.52 Survival sex is a strategy that is used to maintain
economic stability and is often combined with other high-risk behaviors
including “substance use, suicide attempts, STDs, pregnancies and criminal
behavior.”53 According to a recent study, about 28% of street youth and
10% of shelter youth reported that they had engaged in survival sex. The
authors of the study say that it is likely that the subjects “underreported
their participation in survival sex, a highly stigmatized behavior.”54 The

46

Michael G. Vaughn, Aging Out of Foster Care and Legal Involvement: Toward a
Typology of Risk, 82 Soc. Serv. Rev. 422, Univ. of Chi. Press (2008) (asserting that
individuals who were incarcerated in their late teens usually work less and are less

likely to get married than those who were not incarcerated).
47
Id.
48
See John Hagan & Bill McCarthy, On Your Own Without A Net: The Transition
To Adulthood For Vulnerable Populations, 182 (D. Wayne Osgood et al. eds., 2005)
(stating that many homeless youth are arrested for requesting spare change or for
cleaning vehicle windows for money).
49
Chapter VI: Life After Foster Care, Juvenile Justice in California Part II:
Dependency System, League of Women Voters of Cal. (July 1998), available at
http://www.ca.lwv.org/jjds/chap6.html.
50
Jody M. Greene et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Survival Sex Among
Runaway and Homeless Youth, Am. J. of Pub. Health, 1406, 1406-08 (1999), available
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1508758/pdf/amjph00009-0102.pdf
(last visited November 22, 2013).
51
Id.
52
See Ryan, supra note 14, at 277.
53
See Greene, supra note 50, at 1406-08.
54
Id.at 1408.
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proportion of homeless and runaway youth who practice survival sex
ranges from 10% to 50%.55
Youth who are not properly prepared for independent living either
become homeless or are at risk of becoming homeless, so they seek others
who are in similar situations. This can lead to gang involvement, which
can lead to incarceration.56 Some girls who do not have the support of
family members join gangs and earn their keep by servicing the dominant
males in the gang with sex, thus contributing to the “gang economy.”57
Disadvantaged former foster youth who are ill prepared for adult living
may feel as though they have no choice but to turn to gang affiliation in
order to survive. Youths in gangs are often involved in drug trafficking.58
For many former foster youth, dealing drugs is a means of survival.
Without proper preparation for emancipation, many former foster youth
feel as though they have no other choice but to deal drugs in order to
maintain their economic stability.59 Studies show that negative outcomes
such as these are positively correlated with the lack of stability that many
youth experience in foster care situations.60 Independent living programs,
drop-in centers, and outreach programs may help youth find employment
and long-term housing to prevent some of these destructive survival
mechanisms.61
PART III: THE ‘RIGHT TO TREATMENT’ FOR FOSTER YOUTH
Foster youth who age out of the foster care system should have the right
to receive services for the maintenance of successful independent living.
The failure to provide these services is extremely harmful. This harm does
not necessarily show while the youth is in care; it manifests once the youth

55

Id.at 1406.
Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth's Substantive Due
Process Right to Proper Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL'Y 381, 389 (2005).
57
See Greene, supra note 50, at 1407.
58
Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry
v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 309 (2010).
59
Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive
Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 157-58 (2003).
60
Melinda Atkinson, Aging Out of Foster Care: Towards A Universal Safety Net for
Former Foster Care Youth, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 190 (2008).
61
See Greene, supra note 50, 1409.
56
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has left foster care and is living independently. In order to prevent this
harm, courts should establish a ‘right to treatment’ for foster youth.
A.The History of ‘Right to Treatment’ Theories
Advocates in the mental health field brought national attention to the
‘right to treatment.’62 Morton Birnbaum advocated for the concept by
arguing that people who were institutionalized under parens patriae must
receive “adequate medical and psychological treatment.”63 Birnbaum
argued that with a ‘right to treatment’ legislatures would have to provide
appropriate facilities for people in mental institutions.64 The ‘right to
treatment’ can be based on the Constitution or on statute. In Miller v.
Overholser, the court considered the ‘right to treatment’ from a statutory
perspective as it related to the condition for which Miller needed
treatment.65 The court in that case held that a person who is incarcerated
for treatment as a sexual psychopath and had not committed a criminal act,
had a right to receive therapeutic treatment related to the reason for his
commitment.66
If no statutory ‘right to treatment’ existed, the institutionalized person
had to look to the Constitution. The support for the ‘right to treatment’ in
the Constitution was pronounced in Rouse v. Cameron. In that 1966 case,
the court explained that the purpose of committing people involuntarily to a
mental hospital was to treat them for the mental condition that led to the
commitment.67 Without that treatment, the court said that the hospital
would effectively be transformed into a penitentiary where people could be
held indefinitely even though they committed no criminal offense.68 The
court found that failing to provide treatment could violate the confined
person’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.69 The court
explained that confinement without treatment for someone who committed
no crime could be considered so “inhumane as to be cruel and unusual
punishment,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.70

62

Mark H. Marshall, The Right to Treatment for Juveniles in Texas: A Legislative
Proposal, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 142, 145 (1981) (citing Morton Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 499-505 (1960)).
63
See id.
64
Id.
65
Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
66
Id. at 419.
67
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
68
Id.at 453.
69
Id.
70
Id.

2014]

PROVIDING PROPER PREPARATION

13

Since this decision, the ‘right to treatment’ has gained a measure of
acceptance in lower federal courts.71 Those courts have held that
involuntarily committed individuals have the right to receive rehabilitative
treatment under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
possibly under the Eighth Amendment.72 In Wyatt v. Stickney, the court
held that patients involuntarily committed to mental institutions for
treatment purposes “unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive
such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity
to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition.”73
B.The Expansion of the ‘Right to Treatment’
The idea of a ‘right to treatment’ for juvenile offenders came about in the
late nineteenth century. Those were the early days of the juvenile court
movement where progressive reformers envisioned a juvenile correction
system that would provide youth with individualized treatment in a
separate facility from adults.74 Applying the doctrine of parens patriae,
juvenile courts emphasized rehabilitation, supervision, and treatment rather
than punishment. Juvenile hearings were confidential, and children were
deemed delinquent rather than guilty of a crime.75 Juries and lawyers were
not allowed in the proceedings, and dispositions were made by determining
the best interest of the child, with a focus on the character and lifestyle of
that particular child.76
Formal rules were replaced with principles of psychology, and courts
would collect personal information about each child in order to analyze,
diagnose, and cure them.77 In his dissent in K.H. v. Morgan, Judge Coffey
affirmed his support for the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile justice
system. He cited Nelson v. Heyne’s holding that juveniles who were
removed from their parent’s custody and placed in state custody must be
given “appropriate individualized care and treatment.”78 Coffey expanded
this view of individualized care and treatment by quoting the Nelson court:
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In our view the ‘right to treatment’ includes the right to minimum
acceptable standards of care and treatment for juveniles and the
right to individualized care and treatment. Because children differ
in their need for rehabilitation, individual need for treatment will
differ. When a state assumes the place of the juvenile's parents, it
assumes as well the parental duties, and its treatment of its
juveniles should, so far as can be reasonably required, be what
proper parental care would provide.79
The courts recognized that children had different needs based on their
history, environment, and character. Thus, the courts remained flexible
when diagnosing and treating children. This enhanced flexibility meant
fewer legal procedures and more leeway with treatment options. This
leeway required little accountability, and as a result, many unfortunate
occurrences ensued in the lives of the children who were supposed to be
receiving rehabilitation. Instead of receiving ‘appropriate individualized
care and treatment,’80 juveniles received harsh orders of confinement,
which resembled strict penal sentences. The inappropriate treatment
prompted lawyers and scholars to attack the juvenile court system and the
institutional school system where children were being sent for treatment.81
The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault transformed the juvenile
court to one that was strikingly similar to the adult court. In Gault, a
fifteen-year old boy was arrested for violating an Arizona law when he
used foul language over the telephone.82 At an informal hearing he was
‘sentenced’ to confinement in Arizona’s Industrial School for six years.83
His parents filed a petition for his release claiming that their son’s due
process rights were violated.84 The court concluded that a juvenile court
hearing must “measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.”85 In an effort to combine rehabilitation with the emerging
constitutional doctrines, lawyers developed a constitutionally based ‘right
to treatment’ that would apply to juveniles deemed delinquent.
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C. A Description of the Constitutional Theories
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides two bases for
the ‘right to treatment.’ The first is referred to as the quid pro quo theory,
which was endorsed in Morales, Nelson, and Sproat.86 This theory requires
state actors to provide appropriate treatment in relation to the purpose of a
person’s confinement.87 For example, if someone is hospitalized for a
particular illness, treatment for that specific illness is required.88 If the
person is not treated for the purpose of his hospitalization, it is equivalent
to being locked up in a penitentiary without having committed a criminal
offense.89 The second Fourteenth Amendment argument is referred to as
the Purpose Theory. The requirement of this theory is reflected in Jackson
v. Indiana, a United States Supreme Court case. In that case, the Court
held that in order for states to justify restricting a person’s liberty, treatment
must be provided such that it “bear[s] some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed.”90 If no treatment is
provided, and the youth has been confined for purposes other than
punishment, the confinement would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.91
The courts differ in the ways in which they embrace the constitutional
argument of a ‘right to treatment.’ Courts can apply one of the theories or
they can combine them. In Morgan v. Sproat, the court embraced both the
quid pro quo and the purpose arguments. There the court explained that
the purpose of incarcerating juveniles in a training school was for
treatment, and due process required that the programs at the school be
related to that purpose.92 The court also referred to the parens patriae
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See Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (stating that
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doctrine and explained that the juvenile must be given treatment so that the
involuntary commitment did not amount to an “arbitrary exercise of
governmental power proscribed by the due process clause.”93
The plaintiffs in the above cases requested extensive relief. The
plaintiffs’ testimonies about the dangerous facilities and lack of treatment
shocked the judges so much that they issued comprehensive corrective
rulings.94 The courts enjoined inadequate treatment programs, necessitated
student progress reports, and required instruction for corrections officers
about how to provide treatment.95
The ‘right to treatment’ was a powerful claim employed to improve
juvenile facilities until the early 1980’s Supreme Court decision in
Youngberg v. Romeo. This case limited the ‘right to treatment’ for
incarcerated juveniles. In that case, Romeo claimed that he had a right to
safety, freedom from restraint, and minimally adequate training. The Court
granted his first two claims in non-absolute terms,96 and found his third
claim troubling.97 The court ruled narrowly on the third issue asserting that
the State has no constitutional duty to provide substantive services to
people in its care.98 The Court reasoned that no amount of training would
permit his release from the institution and consequently limited his training
to coincide with his need for safety and freedom from bodily restraint.99
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D. Applying the ‘Right to Treatment’ to Foster Youth under Youngberg
Although Youngberg100 limited the ‘right to treatment’ for individuals in
institutions, the right, albeit a narrow one, can be applied effectively to
assist foster youth who are reaching the age of emancipation. The Court’s
holding in Youngberg guaranteed institutionalized people the right to
training for safety and freedom from bodily restraint.101 This right could be
extended to foster youth preparing for emancipation. Foster youth who are
preparing to emancipate from state custody need training to ensure their
personal safety and bodily freedom in the adult world. Necessary training
that should be required for foster youth as it concerns their safety and
freedom when they are emancipating from foster care includes instruction
regarding (1) life skills, (2) housing maintenance, (3) budgeting, (4)
obtaining and maintaining employment, (5) obtaining medical coverage,
and (6) securing community resources and permanent networks.
Without this essential preparation for adulthood from the state actors
responsible for their care, foster youth suffer tremendous harm. Some of
the harms suffered include adult homelessness, unemployment, low
educational achievement, and crimes of desperation. Crimes of desperation
often lead people into situations that compromise their “safety,” which can
also lead to the “bodily restraint” and loss of freedom that comes from
being locked up in a jail cell. These situations are harmful and preventable
if the state actors who are responsible for the care of foster youth would
provide them with necessary tools for economic self-sufficiency.
The similarities between Romeo’s situation and the plight of foster care
youth are striking. The Supreme Court stated in Youngberg:
It is not feasible . . . to define or identify the type of training that
may be required in every case. A court properly may start with the
generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training.
The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms more familiar to
courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable in light of
identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.102
A foster youth who is leaving state custody has a liberty interest in safety
and freedom similar to the way that Romeo in Youngberg did. At least one
court has recognized the connection between Romeo and foster youth. In
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, the Second Circuit extended the reasoning in

100

Id. at 317.
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Youngberg to children in foster care.103 The court in that case agreed with
the court in Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, that
“[w]hen individuals are placed in custody or under the care of the
government, their governmental custodians are sometimes charged with
affirmative duties, the nonfeasance of which may violate the
constitution.”104 The Marisol court held that the children stated a sufficient
Fourteenth Amendment claim for the “defendants’ failure to provide
reasonable services and placements that protect [the foster children’s] right
of association with their biological family members.”105
E. Teenagers in Foster Care Should Have a ‘Right to Treatment’
Teenagers may have acquired the necessary skills to avoid physical harm
while they are in foster care, but they need special training in order to avoid
harm after they emancipate from the system.106 Documents sent to
Congress indicate that foster youth who age out of the system experience
“high rates of homelessness, non-marital childbearing, poverty, and
delinquent or criminal behavior; they are also frequently the target of crime
and physical assaults.”107 The Foster Care Independence Act recommends
that state and local governments offer extensive financial assistance, and
programs for education, training, and employment to foster youth who are
preparing for emancipation.108
When teenagers emancipate from the foster care system, they often lose
contact with their state-appointed caregivers. Keeping track of youth after
they emancipate would require an inordinate amount of time, money, and
effort. This fact necessitates that state actors provide foster youth with
workable life skills so they can succeed in adulthood. When foster youth
succeed after emancipation, society benefits. Training for adulthood could
help former foster youth stay off public assistance and out of prison or
other state-sponsored institutions. Instead of turning to crime for economic
support, emancipated foster youth will be more likely to get a legal job, go
to college, and be productive members of society.
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Some may argue that extending the ‘right to treatment’ to foster youth
would bring about more financial constraints and disincentivize social
workers from removing children from dangerous situations. The problem,
however, does not lie in the extra responsibility that comes from parenting
the youth. The court in K.H. asserted that the problem lies in the limited
supply of financial resources in the child welfare system. 109 The lack of
financial resources may provide some insight into why courts do not
recognize the affirmative right of treatment for foster youth, but do
recognize a right for freedom from harm. Providing services can be
extremely costly; refraining from harm is free.
PART IV: THE EVOLUTION OF FOSTER YOUTH’S SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS RIGHT OF FREEDOM FROM HARM
Foster youth who age out of the foster care system face serious
difficulties and States should provide services for these youth so they can
become self-sufficient adults. When a youth is in foster care, the state
assumes a parental role. The state actors should be required by law to
protect foster children from harm by providing treatment in the form of
services to prepare the youth for adulthood. These services should include
the provision of access to support systems and educational and employment
opportunities so that foster youth can acquire the tools they need to succeed
in their transition to independent living.

A.The Right to Be Free From Harm in Prisons and Mental
Health Facilities
In DeShaney v. Winnebego County Department of Social Services, the
Court analogized the rights of abused and neglected children to the rights
of prisoners and mentally retarded persons.110 The Supreme Court initially
recognized that prisoners had a right to humane conditions and adequate
medical treatment in Estelle v. Gamble.111 Later, the Supreme Court in
Youngberg v. Romeo recognized that mental health patients have a right to
freedom from harm.112 These two cases serve as the foundation for the
constitutional right to safety while in state custody. Under Section 1983,
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this right can be used to enforce an affirmative duty on state actors to
ensure that those who are in state custody are safe from harm.113
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court stated that prisoners are entitled
to medical care under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishment clause.114 The plaintiff, a prisoner, had serious medical
problems including a back injury. When he asked to see a doctor, prison
personnel denied him access to services. Gamble brought a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the prison personnel subjected
him to cruel and unusual punishment, thus violating his Eighth Amendment
rights. The Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s
serious injuries constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The court
concluded that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
prisoners constituted an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”115
The Court stated that in this case however, there was not deliberate
indifference because medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times
within three months.116
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court found that committed persons
“possessed constitutionally protected liberty interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”117 In this case, a mentally retarded person who was
involuntarily committed to a mental institution suffered many injuries
because of his actions and the actions of other residents.118 The court
explained that when a person is institutionalized there is a duty “to provide
certain services and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its
responsibilities.”119 The Court also said that the patient had a due process
right to “reasonably safe conditions of confinement.”120 The Court
reasoned that, “if it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted
criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the
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involuntarily committed — who may not be punished at all — in unsafe
conditions.”121
B. A Child’s Right to Safety: Pre-DeShaney
In Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, a foster child
filed a civil rights action against the New York Department of Social
Services for failing to supervise her in her foster care placement.122 The
court held that a defendant may be liable under Section 1983 if the agency
knew of an injury, risk, or specific duty, and exhibited deliberate
indifference. In addition, the failure to perform the duty or ameliorate the
risk must have been the proximate cause of the deprivation of the plaintiff’s
rights.123
In Taylor v. Ledbetter, the court found that state actors must take
affirmative action to “ensure the well being and promote the welfare of
children in foster care.”124 When an official is charged with failing to
exercise an affirmative duty, a Section 1983 action can arise if two
requirements are satisfied.125 First, the failure to act must have been the
substantial factor that led to the violation of the liberty or property
interest.126 Second, the responsible official must have displayed deliberate
indifference.127 The court relied on Youngberg and Estelle when it stated
that the Fourteenth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”128 The
court reasoned that society has been outraged at the mistreatment that
defenseless children have faced, and acknowledged that “it is time that the
law give to these defenseless children at least the same protection afforded
adults who are imprisoned as a result of their own misdeeds.”129
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C.The Supreme Court Limits the Protection of Children: The
DeShaney Case
Joshua DeShaney lived with an abusive father who beat him often.130
The Department of Social Services was aware of the abuse and took
“various steps to protect him,” but it let him stay with his father.131
Joshua’s father eventually beat him so severely that he suffered permanent
brain damage, leaving him severely retarded.132 Joshua’s mother filed suit
against the county and the Department of Social Services.133 The Supreme
Court held that the state did not have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to
protect a child who was not in its custody, but who had been with his
parent the whole time.134 The Court did recognize, however, that “in
certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposed upon the State
affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular
individuals.”135
Several Courts of Appeals have held that if States fail to protect foster
children from mistreatment they may be liable under the Due Process
Clause.136 In footnote nine, the Court stated, “had the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from free society and
placed him in a foster home by its agents, we might have a situation
sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to
an affirmative duty to protect.”137

D.The Lower Courts’ Post-DeShaney Interpretations
Lower courts generally interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in
DeShaney to mean that while youth are in the foster care system, they have
a substantive due process right to be free from harm.138 In Nicini v. Morra,
Tony Nicini had been abused by his parents and had attempted suicide.139
After his release from John F. Kennedy’s Crisis Center he went to live with
130
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an unofficial foster family during which time he was under the supervision
of the state.140 He subsequently ran away from the home alleging that the
foster father, Edward Morra, had given him alcohol and drugs and had
sexually assaulted him. Investigation into the foster father’s past revealed
that he had been previously convicted for corrupting a minor and for
distributing controlled substances to a minor.141 Nicini filed suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983142 and state tort law against Frank Cyrus, the caseworker
with the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Youth
and Family Services.143
The court held that just as the state had an
affirmative duty to provide for the needs of prisoners, it had the same duty
to foster children because the situations are analogous.144 The court
explained, “when the state places a child in state-regulated foster care, the
state has entered into a special relationship with that child, which imposes
upon it certain affirmative duties. The failure to perform such duties can
give rise, under sufficiently culpable circumstances, to liability under
section 1983.”145
In Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, a civil rights action was
filed on behalf of foster children who were allegedly abused while in foster
care.146 The Sixth Circuit held “that due process extends the right to be free
from the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in state-regulated foster
homes.”147 Several other courts recognize that right as well, including
Taylor v. Ledbetter, a pre-DeShaney case. In that case, a foster child filed
suit against Georgia state and county officials for abuse suffered at the
hands of a foster parent.148 Through her guardian, the child filed suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the state and county officials
were grossly negligent and indifferent to her welfare.149 The court held that
a child who had been placed in a foster home involuntarily was in a similar
situation to a prisoner and a child locked up in a mental facility.150 Thus,
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the foster child could file suit under section 1983 for violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment rights.151
In Braam v. Washington, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
upholding the due process rights of foster youth was in line with “the
weight of authority among our sister courts.”152 Foster care is a form of
state custody and foster care workers can be held liable for denying a foster
youth his right to safety if the child is harmed because of the denial.153 The
courts have found that the right exists and they are willing to hold state
actors liable for violating that right.154 This is important in the protection
of foster youth, but the rights of children who are not in custody are still in
question.155
PART V: CONFLICTING STANDARDS: “DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE” OR “PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT”
There are two competing standards that the courts use when determining
the liability of state actors who fail to comply with their obligations to
foster youth. The standards originate from the Supreme Court cases Estelle
v. Gamble and Youngberg v. Romeo. The Estelle standard requires a
stricter level of proof than the Youngberg standard although some courts
have stated that the standards are so similar that either could apply in any
situation.156 The result of these competing standards, and no Supreme
Court ruling on the subject, is a circuit split regarding which standard of
care applies to foster youth – the standard that applies to prisoners or the
standard that applies to institutionalized mental patients.
The Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebego County Department of
Social Services found that the situation of foster youth is “sufficiently
analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an
affirmative duty to protect.”157 The duty to protect prisoners is governed by
the standard known as “deliberate indifference”. The duty of care for
institutionalized mental patients is the “professional judgment” standard.
The DeShaney Court, having decided that foster youth are in state custody,
did not give clear guidance as to which standard of care applied:
“deliberate indifference” or “professional judgment.”158
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The standard that courts apply is critical because depending on which
standard is applied, there could be no right for foster youth to live in safe
conditions or to receive emancipation preparation services. On one hand,
foster youth may have a minimal level of safety and treatment guaranteed
by the Constitution if they reside in a circuit that finds that foster youth are
more analogous to prisoners. On the other hand, foster youth may have a
higher level of safety and treatment guaranteed by the Constitution if they
reside in a circuit that analogizes foster youth to institutionalized mental
patients. This conflict occurs because Estelle was an Eighth Amendment
case about a prisoner who had to show that the state had the requisite mens
rea of intent.159 If this standard is applied to foster youth, the court will
require that the child show a highly culpable state of mind, which would
lead to the provision of a very low level of protection for foster youth. In
contrast, the Youngberg court, when deciding a case about an
institutionalized person, analyzed the case under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which set the state of mind requirement much lower.160 This
created a much stronger duty for the protection of foster children.

A.The Deliberate Indifference Standard: Estelle v. Gamble
Deliberate indifference is the standard of liability under the Eighth
Amendment for state actors exercising custody over prisoners under
Section 1983.161 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court established the deliberate
indifference standard for state actors who were responsible for attending to
the medical needs of prisoners.162 The Court explained that deliberate
indifference is manifested by intentional denial or delayed access to
medical care or intentional interference with treatment.163 The Court also
said that there is a right of action against prison doctors under Section 1983
for deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury.164 In
Doe, the Second Circuit found deliberate indifference on the part of the
Bureau. 165 The court stated that the agency could be held liable under
Section 1983 for failing to report suspected child abuse to authorities after
being informed by school authorities.166 The court reasoned that liability
could be based on an inference “from a pattern of omissions revealing
159
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deliberate inattention to specific duties imposed for the purpose of
safeguarding plaintiffs from abuse.”167
In Farmer v. Brennan, a transsexual prisoner brought a suit against
prison officials for placing him in general population.168 The prisoner
claimed that the officials showed “deliberate indifference,” by failing to
keep him safe from other inmates.169 The Supreme Court relied on the
opinion in Estelle and held that a prison official could not be held liable for
placing a prisoner in general population unless the official knew of and
disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”170 The Court
concluded that, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.”171 The Court further explained that the
Eighth Amendment does not forbid cruel and unusual “conditions,” just
cruel and unusual “punishments.”172 This high standard of proof allows for
a significant amount of abuse when it comes to preventing harm in prisons.
Many of the circuit courts that rely on Estelle for foster care issues set a
similarly high standard of proof for state actors who are charged with
caring for foster youth.173 For example, in Taylor, the deliberate
indifference standard was applied to determine whether state actors could
be liable for harm.174 The court stated that meeting the standard would be
arduous. The court explained that in order to successfully recover under
Section 1983 from state actors, a foster child “will be faced with the
difficult problem of showing actual knowledge of abuse or that agency
personnel deliberately failed to learn what was occurring in the foster
home.”175 Nonetheless, several circuit courts follow the standards laid out
in Doe and Taylor when applying the deliberate indifference standard.176

167

Id.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 837.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 810-11(3d Cir. 2000); Norfleet v. Ark. Dept. of
Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791,
796 (11th Cir. 1987); N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 145.
174
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 793.
175
Id. at 796.
176
Norfleet, 989 F.2d at 292; K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990);
Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990).
168

2014]

PROVIDING PROPER PREPARATION

27

B.The Professional Judgment Standard: Youngberg v.
Romeo
In Youngberg, the Court established that state actors who cared for
mental health facility patients must exercise professional judgment.177 The
Court distinguished patients in mental facilities from prisoners by stating,
“persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” 178 The Court did not
specify which actions were acceptable or unacceptable, but it did state that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment standard is lower
than the “compelling” or “substantial” necessity tests.179 The Court applied
a reasonableness test to determine whether the state actor exercised
professional judgment and emphasized that, “courts must show deference
to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional.”180
The Court in Youngberg held valid a caseworker’s appropriate
professional judgment, which meant that caseworkers are not responsible
for decisions that may turn out poorly, just those where they did not
exercise professional judgment.181 The Court added:
In determining what is “reasonable”-in this and in any case
presenting a claim for training by a State-we emphasize that courts
must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified
professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to
conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary
with the internal operations of these institutions should be
minimized.182
The Court here emphasized that judges are not the ones to determine the
standards that should apply in the context of care. Instead, the language
177
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lack of protection.” The compelling necessity standard ensures that institutionalized
residents are “left unrestrained unless some compelling necessity justifies their
restraint.” These standards provide a way for the court and jury “to distinguish
between isolated incidents and inadvertent accidents, on the one hand, and persistent
disregard of patients' needs, on the other.”).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 323.
182
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322.
178

28

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 4:1

suggests that qualified professionals are to establish the required level of
care. A judge, according to Youngberg, can find that a worker failed to
exercise professional judgment, the standards of which were set by the
state. In applying that standard, the act of conducting oneself poorly alone
can be used as a determination of failure to use professional judgment. 183
Although the standards are not explicit, the courts do provide some
guidance.
The courts subsequent to the Youngberg decision typically apply a fourpart test to determine whether the state actor failed to exercise professional
judgment. The plaintiff must show that: (1) the state actor failed to
exercise professional judgment; (2) the state actor did not supervise to a
reasonable degree; (3) the harm was reasonably foreseeable; and (4) there
was a causal link between the injury and the failure to supervise.184 For
example, in Wendy H. v. City of Philadelphia, the court held that the city
worker who was responsible for supervising the foster youth did not
exercise professional judgment when she failed to (1) visit the youth every
six months; (2) monitor school performance; (3) read and evaluate
psychiatric evaluations; and (4) maintain contact with the foster family.185
C. Applying the Professional Judgment Standard to Foster Youth
Youngberg established the substantive due process right of safety and
freedom from bodily restraint for institutionalized mental patients.186 This
right should be extended to foster youth. Foster youth have a right to
treatment and safety and the circuit split regarding the current standards of
care endangers them. Foster youth who are preparing to emancipate from
the system need training for adulthood in order to avoid harms such as
homelessness, poverty, and incarceration. The Supreme Court should
resolve the circuit split so that the professional judgment standard will be
applied consistently in the context of foster care.
That standard can be applied to protect the constitutional rights of foster
youth, while recognizing the interests of the state. In keeping the interests
of the state and foster youth in mind, foster youth have a constitutional
right to adequate care and treatment. State actors must determine the
individual needs of the youth in their care and take appropriate action in
response to those needs. Once the state actors have taken actions they
deem appropriate, those actions should be scrutinized to determine whether
they are Constitutional. State actors should be held liable if their conduct
constitutes a substantial departure from the accepted guidelines of
183
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professional judgment. The professional judgment standard clearly
distinguishes between conduct that is acceptable and conduct that is in
violation of minimum requirements of conduct. This standard effectively
balances the constitutional rights of foster youth against the state’s
legitimate interests.
D. Strengthening Youngberg: Foster Children Are Not Like Prisoners
The plaintiff in Estelle v. Gamble was a prisoner in a state correctional
facility;187 the plaintiff in Youngberg v. Romeo was a mentally retarded
man committed to an institution by his mother who could no longer care for
him.188 Both of these men were involuntarily committed to state custody,
but Gamble voluntarily committed a criminal act and was sentenced to
prison.189 Romeo was mentally retarded and had no control over himself or
his actions; he had the mental acuity of an 18-month-old child.190
Older children fall somewhere between the Gamble/Romeo spectrum as
it concerns being responsible for their actions. Parents, however, can
overpower their children and subject them to situations that are beyond the
child’s control. For example, a parent can send a child to a foster home or
an institution against the child’s will and there is nothing that the child can
do to prevent the situation from occurring. The child, then, is not
responsible for the placement, nor can she be held responsible for her
parent’s decision to hand her over to the state.
Children are innocent and different from prisoners in several ways.
First, a child is not responsible for a parent’s decision to commit her to
foster care. Second, if the parent committed the child to foster care because
of the child’s behavioral problems, the child is still innocent because of her
status as a child. In addition, children are not held accountable for their
actions in the same way that adults are. Courts treat juvenile offenders
much differently than adult offenders.191 The innocence of a child is
similar to the innocence of the mentally retarded man in Youngberg who
could not control his behavior. The standard for judging children should
account for “children's vulnerability and their needs for ‘concern, . . .
sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.”192 State actors deemed responsible
for the care of foster youth should be held to the professional judgment
187
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standard laid out by the Youngberg court because children are more like the
helpless man in Youngberg than the prisoner in Estelle.
PART VI: PROTECTING CHILDREN VOLUNTARILY PLACED
IN FOSTER CARE
The connection between prisoners, mentally retarded patients, and foster
care youth is that most of them were involuntarily placed in the state’s care.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that unless a person is
involuntarily placed in state care, he does not have a substantive due
process right to safety.193 In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department
of Social Services, Charles Milburn’s parents placed him in foster care
when he was almost two years old.194 When it had been found that the
foster care parents had abused Charles, the biological father filed suit.195
The court relied on the facts in DeShaney and held that the foster parents
were not state actors because the State had not removed the child and
placed him in a foster home. The parents had given him up voluntarily.196
In Jordan v. Tennessee, the parents of a severely mentally retarded boy
placed him in a residential facility.197 One evening, the boy wandered out
of a propped-open door and fell into a pond on the grounds of the facility
and drowned.198 The court held that without affirmative action by the state
to restrict the liberty of an individual by involuntarily committing him to a
mental institution, there is no constitutional duty to provide for the safety of
that person.199 The district court in this case also maintained that DeShaney
determined the outcome.
It is particularly dangerous to distinguish between voluntarily and
involuntarily placed foster children because there are many children who
are placed into care by their parents.200 This voluntary/involuntary standard
means a large population of foster children is not entitled to a right of
safety in foster care settings.201 When a child is placed in state care it is not
voluntary because the child is not choosing to be committed; the parent
makes the decision. In Youngberg, the mother of a mentally retarded man
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named Nicholas Romeo placed him in an institution.202 Romeo did not
have control over his institutionalization, and neither did Charles Milburn
have control over his commitment to the foster care system.203 The
voluntariness standard in the foster care context means that a child could be
placed in the system against his will, but if his parents committed him it
would be considered voluntary in the law’s eyes.204
There has been at least one federal appellate court that has seemingly
rejected the voluntariness test when considering a foster child’s substantive
due process right to safety.205 In Meador, the court noted that the parents
had abandoned their three children who were subsequently placed in a
foster care home by their grandfather. While the girls were in the foster
care home they were sexually abused.206
Without discussing the
voluntariness standard, the Sixth Circuit held “that due process extends the
right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in stateregulated foster homes.” This holding is sound because in application
foster parents should be held to the same standard of care as biological
parents and should provide a safe environment regardless of whether the
child was placed voluntarily or involuntarily.207
Many federal courts have adopted the view as well and look suspiciously
at the voluntariness standard in the case of persons who have been admitted
to state institutions. Those courts assert that voluntarily placed individuals
do not have a lesser right to safety than those who were involuntarily
committed to mental institutions. For example, in Kolpak v. Bell the court
held that persons placed in a mental institution whether voluntarily or
involuntarily were constitutionally entitled to safety.208 The court in Seide
v. Prevost concluded that the voluntary/involuntary classification that
would guarantee liberty interests to those committed to state institutions
involuntarily, but would deny the same liberty to those who were
voluntarily committed, would not withstand the strict scrutiny requirement
of the equal protection clause.209 The court said that regardless of
voluntary or involuntary commitment, the State may not deprive any

202

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 318-19.
See Ryan, supra note 13, at 301.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 304.
206
Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990); see also
Ryan, supra note 13, at 304.
207
See Ryan, supra note 13, at 305.
208
619 F. Supp. 359, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see also Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F.
Supp. 610, 617 (D.R.I. 1978) aff'd, 605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979).
209
536 F. Supp. 1121, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
203

32

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 4:1

citizen of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.”210
There are definite distinctions between mentally retarded persons and
foster children, but one federal court has embraced this view as it relates to
foster care. In Wilder v. City of New York, Mr. Wilder was a foster child
and ward of the City. The court asserted that although he was not
committed to an institution involuntarily, he was unable to make certain
decisions for himself and “could have looked only to the City to ensure that
protection.” The court stated, “[an] individual's liberty is not less worthy of
protection merely because he has consented to be placed in a situation of
confinement.”211 Although there are differences between mentally
retarded adults and foster children, both classes should have
constitutionally protected liberty interests regardless of the type of consent.
Unless the Supreme Court recognizes that the voluntary/involuntary
distinction presents dangers to due process, a significant number of foster
children are at risk. Children who are removed from their parents’ custody
by the state will be protected under the Due Process Clause, but those given
up voluntarily will not. Some parents realize that they cannot effectively
take care of their children and believe that the only way that they can
improve their children’s life is to turn them over to the state. If parents
know that their children are not protected from harm under the
Constitution, they may keep them in an unsafe situation. Courts need to
consider the effects of granting the constitutional right to safety to some
and not others in state custodial care.
Foster youth should have a substantive due process right to services
whether they entered the system voluntarily or involuntarily. The Court in
Braam words it nicely when it concludes that “at its core, foster children
have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable risk of
harm, including a risk flowing from the lack of basic services, and a right
to reasonable safety.”212
PART VII: LITIGATION STRATEGIES
A.42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Right of Action
Foster youth are relatively helpless because of their reliance on state
appointed caregivers for protection. If a staff member or foster parent
harms them, there is little they can do to remove themselves from the
situation. There are also no reliable legal remedies with which they can
210
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seek relief. 213 Foster youth have filed state tort law actions and federal
statutory claims under Section 1983, but these claims are largely
unsuccessful.214 Federal claims under Section 1983 for a violation of a
foster youth’s substantive due process rights have proven to be more
successful for those who have suffered harm while in foster care.215
1. History of the Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted in order to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment against “state or local officials who violated the
‘rights, privileges, or immunities' of persons in the United States.”216
Section 1 of the Act, which was later codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allows
private citizens to file suit against state actors for violating their federal and
Constitutional rights.217 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is often used
to hold public agencies and employees liable for harm caused to foster
children in their care.218 The relevant part of the statute states:
Every person who, under color of law of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage … subjects or
causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.219
2. Section 1983 for Substantive Due Process Violations
Generally, state law and federal statutory claims are unsuccessful.
However, foster youth can file claims concerning a violation of their
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constitutional rights under Section 1983.220 The statute serves to protect
individuals from state infringement on their individual rights.221 The
Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.222
This Amendment was created so that people could assert Fourteenth
Amendment claims against the government for violating their civil
rights.223 The Fourteenth Amendment creates no new substantive due
process rights, but people can recover if established rights have been
violated.224 In order to bring a Section 1983 action, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant was a person (this includes state actors), and that the
defendant’s act caused a person to be subjected to the “deprivation of any
federally protected rights, privileges, or immunities.”225
To overcome any defenses of qualified immunity that the government
may put forth, the plaintiff must show that the constitutional right was
clearly established when the event occurred.226 With the number of foster
youth who are harmed in the foster care system, the courts must establish a
consistent, workable standard for their care. This new standard should
address the youth’s needs and state actors must be held accountable if they
fail to live up to the standard.
B.Class Action Lawsuits Under the Social Security Act
One of the most common litigation strategies for large groups of foster
youth is the class action. In Palmer v. Cuomo, foster children in New York,
some of whom had emancipated from the foster care system and were
living independently as well as some who were homeless, brought an
action to enjoin the city and state to provide adequate pre-discharge
preparatory plans and to properly supervise the children who had
emancipated to independent living.227 The Supreme Court, Appellate
220
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Division, held that the city had a statutory duty to perform its pre-discharge
preparatory
obligations
and
its
post-discharge
supervisory
responsibilities.228 The court concluded that the City of New York is
required to provide independent living skills training prior to discharging
the children.229 The court asserted that the city had the responsibility to
“ensure training related to career objectives, including obtaining
marketable skills or trades, career counseling, and assistance in enrolling in
employment programs . . . until the child is discharged.”230 The court
found that there was no indication that the foster children received the
required training and assistance.231
The many complexities of foster care litigation are highlighted in G.L. v.
Zumwalt. In that case, foster children in Missouri brought an action against
the defendants for violating their right to be free from harm, which is
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IV of the Social
Security Act.232 The Jackson County Office of the Missouri Division of
Family Services denied that it violated the children’s rights.233 The district
court approved a consent decree entered into by the parties that provided
that foster children would be guaranteed to receive essential services to
treat psychological, emotional and intellectual problems.234 The decree
also guaranteed to each child a permanency plan, which would determine
whether the child would reunite with her parents, get adopted, or
emancipate.235 The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees in the amount of $40,000, but the parties agreed to withdraw
the plaintiff’s claims for damages.236
The court in Wolfe v. New Mexico Department of Human Services also
approved a consent degree requiring the Department and its top officials to
fulfill certain requirements.237 In that case, children in state custody filed
suit against the New Mexico Department of Human Services and other
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state officials for failing to develop permanency plans.238 The Department
moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim and filed a motion for
summary judgment.239 The court approved a consent decree and noted that
a violation of liberty interests could be analyzed under due process.240 The
court said liberty denotes freedom from bodily restraint, the right to enter
into a contract, to right to engage in an occupation, to acquire knowledge,
to marry, to establish a home and raise children, to worship God as you
please, and to enjoy recognized privileges.241
The liberty interests must have been created by a specific state or federal
law, or be implicit in the Constitution. The court concluded that the
plaintiffs could obtain relief for violations of Title IV and XX of the Social
Security Act, and that the plaintiffs could also recover monetary relief for
denial of their civil rights from the “defendants in their individual
capacities.”242 The court noted, however, that under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Department and the officials in their official capacities
were immune from suit to the extent that the complaint stated a claim for
money damages.243 The consent decree was issued, detailing a plan to
restructure the foster care system in New Mexico.244 This case opened
many doors to foster youth, and provided them with future opportunities
for successful litigation.
C.Common Law Tort Claims
Common law tort claims are commonly advanced by foster youth against
foster care agencies when attempting to recover for abuse and neglect while
238
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in the state’s custody. The claim is usually directed against the agency or
an employee of the agency under the principle of vicarious liability.245 The
common law tort claim is negligence, which is asserted for the purposes of
recovering from the agency. The elements of negligence, such that a cause
of action may be stated are duty, breach, causation, and harm.246
A cause of action based on negligence asserts that the agency has “a
duty, or obligation recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform
to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks.”247 The duty that the foster care agency has is in the
form of parens patriae248 because the agency has taken on the
responsibility of caring for the foster child in situations where the child’s
natural parent cannot or will not.
Establishing that the agency breached a duty is more difficult. The
plaintiff must show that the person failed to conform to a required
standard.249 In order to prove causation, the plaintiff must show that there
was a “reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury.”250 This is commonly known as “proximate cause,” and is
also comprised of causation in fact.251 Finally, the plaintiff must show that
there was “actual loss or damage.”252 If actual loss or damage cannot be
shown, damages will not be awarded.253
Proving all of these elements is difficult and can significantly limit the
number of actions brought against foster care agencies. Governmental
immunity may also make a claim difficult because it can completely bar the
tort claim.254 In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (In re Terrell R.),
the court explained that the social workers were immune to the lawsuits
245
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brought by the foster children who were injured while in foster care.255 The
court reasoned that the social worker did not have a mandatory duty to
supervise and the foster care statute was designed to preserve families, not
to prevent abuse.256
Several courts have held that when state actors place a child in foster
care they are entitled to governmental immunity even if the placement is
done negligently, because the act of making serious personal judgments
constitutes a discretionary act.257 In Brantley v. Department of Human
Resources, biological parents of a two-year-old who drowned while in
foster care brought a negligence action against the Department of Human
Resources. The State agreed to waive its sovereign immunity under the
Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA) subject to the discretionary function
exception. Under this function, the state is not liable for “[t]he exercise or
performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not
the discretion involved is abused.”258
The court held that deciding to leave a two-year-old unattended in a
swimming pool was an insufficient basis on which to invoke the exception.
The court reasoned that the decision to leave the child unattended was not
the type of governmental decision that should be protected from judicial
review. This case highlights the fact that not all state actors are immune
from actions brought by youth in their care. New York’s Court of Appeals
follows this standard as well, and allows foster youth to plead common law
255
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mandatory duty . . . In addition, the purpose of the statute is to preserve the family
relationship, not to prevent sexual abuse.”)
257
E.g., Jackson v. Dep't of Human Res., 497 S.E.2d 58, 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that a public officer who places a child in foster care is entitled to
governmental immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act because he is “exercising
discretion in the performance of his official duties”); Gloria G. v. State Dep't of Soc.
Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 987-88 (Kan. 1992) (holding that the complex judgments
made by the government and its agents “rank high on the continuum of discretion and
should not be subject to hindsight scrutiny by courts”); Williams v. Horton, 437
N.W.2d 18, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a caseworker had immunity under
the Michigan Tort Claims Act because the placement was discretionary because it
required a high degree of personal judgment).
258
Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-24(2) (West 2013). The GTCA defines a “discretionary
function or duty” as “a function or duty requiring a state officer or employee to
exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of action
based upon a consideration of social, political, or economic factors.”
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tort negligence claims against child welfare officials without being barred
by governmental immunity.259
Not all states, however, waive tort
immunity, so a foster youth’s ability to assert a tort claim will depend on
where she lives.
Tort claims are asserted for foster children based on actions of abuse or
neglect. This theory will likely prove inadequate in litigation for foster
youth who want to bring an action for a failure to receive services to
prepare them for adulthood. It will be extremely difficult to prove that the
failure to provide the services was the proximate cause of the harm suffered
after the youth left foster care. The foster youth will have to prove that the
cause of his or her homelessness, incarceration, unemployment, or low
educational achievement was due to the state failing to provide services to
prepare him or her for emancipation.
A dangerous road lies ahead for foster youth who are not adequately
prepared by the state actors responsible for protecting them from harm, and
it requires legal action. The case law establishes that foster youth have a
constitutional right to treatment and safety while they are in state custody.
Foster youth can file: (1) a civil rights claim under Section 1983 for a
substantive due process violation, (2) a class action lawsuit under the
Social Security Act, or (3) a common law tort claim, if they do not receive
proper emancipation preparation training and aftercare services. 260 To
strengthen their case, plaintiffs could show that there are former foster
youth who are destitute as a result of state actors who failed to properly
prepare them for independent living.261 In addition, plaintiffs could
strengthen their case by proving that previous foster children suffered harm
259

Mark G. v. Sabol, 717 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (N.Y. 1999) (“Section 419’s legislative
history . . . reveals that it was intended to provide immunity only with respect to civil or
criminal liability that would otherwise result from acts taken by persons, officials, or
institutions in a good faith effort to comply with specific provisions of the Social
Services Law . . . There is no indication that section 419 was intended to apply to
failures to provide services required by the Social Services Law.”).
260
Palmer, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 21 (granting plaintiffs preliminary injunction enjoining
defendants from discharging plaintiffs from foster care until (1) a discharge plan had
been adopted for plaintiffs pursuant to Social Service Law; (2) plaintiffs were given
reasonable preparation for discharge including career counseling, training in a
marketable trade, and skills for independent living; and (3) plaintiffs were given
reasonable notice of their discharge, directing defendants to provide supervision of
each plaintiff until he is 21 years old, ensuring plaintiffs’ basic needs are met, including
appropriate housing outside of the New York City municipal shelter system).
261
Id. at 21-22 (showing seven foster children discharged prior to the age of 21,
without adequate preparation for independent living and given no opportunity to
contest the discharge led to their destitution).
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because state actors failed to contact them for supervisory meetings after
discharge.262
PART VIII: RECOMMENDATIONS
Youth who emancipate from the foster care system are less likely to have
a high school diploma, go to college or vocational school, or make enough
money to support themselves.263 After leaving the foster care system,
many foster youth flounder. A recent study conducted by Fostering
Careers, found that nearly half of former foster youth in their twenties were
unemployed at any given time.264 This makes it more likely that they will
become homeless, dependent on welfare, or incarcerated.265
The courts realize that they have a duty to prepare foster youth in state
custody for emancipation, and have ruled in favor of foster youth to help
ensure that they are adequately prepared for emancipation. There are five
recommended steps that would assist the state actors in fulfilling their duty
to foster youth, thus providing adequate emancipation preparation. These
recommendations are achievable and will work to improve the foster care
system so that it can more effectively support foster youth’s career goals
and personal development.
A. Independent Living Programs
States should create programs that are aimed to (1) provide referrals to
service agencies; (2) develop interventions for foster youth; (3) provide
professional development services to staff members; and (4) build
partnerships with employers.266 The programs would work to serve a
distinct population of disconnected youth.267 New York City has two
programs that provide for the needs of foster youth: The Academy and the
262

Id. at 22 (showing inadequacies, such as failure to contact or offer assistance or
supervision following discharge from foster care led to foster children’s’ destitution).
263
Alice Bussiere, Jennifer Pokempner & Jennifer Troia, Adolescents, the Foster
Care System, and the Transition to Adulthood: What Legal Aid Lawyers Need to Know,
39 Clearinghouse Rev. J. of Poverty L. & Pol'y 159, 159 (July-Aug. 2005) (discussing
the challenges faced by youth who emancipate from foster care).
264
Tom Hilliard, Foster Youth and the Workforce: Next Steps, Center for an Urban
Future 1, 3 (2013), http://nycfuture.org/pdf/Foster_Youth_and_the_Workforce.pdf
(stating foster youths’ unemployment is a key reason for their poor adult outcomes).
265
Id. at 3 (stating foster youths’ unemployment makes them more likely to succumb
to homelessness, welfare dependence, or incarceration).
266
See Hilliard, supra note 262, at 4 (discussing the City of New York’s
responsibility to provide adequate programs to prepare foster youth for employment
after they are discharged).
267
Id. at 4 (stating New York City’s Office of Youth Development should not limit
itself to serving foster youth, but should serve a designated population rather than the
broad population of disconnected youth).

2014]

PROVIDING PROPER PREPARATION

41

Next Generation Center have developed strategies to help foster youth who
face employment barriers.268 The programs are not identical, but they both
provide a variety of services for foster youth that will help bridge any gaps
they may have in their approach to adulthood.269
B. Collect Data and Report Outcomes
In formulating a plan to evaluate programs, assess costs, and target
resources for foster youth, data collection is essential.270 There are two
methods of data collection that can be useful: point-in-time data, which is
collected annually; and administrative data, which is collected regularly by
different organizations and then aggregated into a system.271 This data can
be used to measure former foster youth’s performance after emancipation,
and to ensure that the proper tools are being implemented.272 The results
generated by the reports can be used to build support for plans to provide
more efficient resources for foster youth.273 Progress can be measured by
identifying goals, collecting data, and monitoring progress.274 If leaders in
the community can see the outcomes, they will be better able to make
informed decisions about whether to invest in a program.275 Without this
type of data, it will be hard to determine which services are effective and
which need improvement.
C. Independent Living Committees
Life after emancipation for foster youth can be frightening especially if
the youth have no support systems. The formation of an independent living
committee, a group of people who work together to aid foster youth in their
268
Id. at 5 (citing the Academy and The Next Generation Center as New York City’s
most promising breakthrough in serving high-needs foster youth).
269
Id. at 5 (providing services including education, preparation for work, and job
search).
270
Mary Cunningham, Sharon McDonald & Norm Suchar, Homelessness In
America, Volume 3: Solutions to Homelessness, 10 (Robert Hartmann McNamara eds.,
2008) (stating careful examination of data can lead to shifts in how communities
respond to homelessness).
271
Id. at 10-11 (discussing the different, but complementary methods communities
use to collect data).
272
Id. at 11 (describing how communities use collected data to develop plans for
ending homelessness).
273
Id. (stating results generated by data collection build support for plans enacted to
end homelessness).
274
Id. (“Promising communities are able to demonstrate progress because they
identify performance measures, collect data, and continually monitor progress.”)
275
Id. (tracking outcomes allows leaders to make informed decisions regarding
continued investment in new strategies or exploration of other interventions).
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transition to adulthood, could help youth if the members work to build
awareness among the foster youth and the community about independent
living services.276 KidsVoice is a Pennsylvania legal services organization
that has developed a model program. It represents about 5,000 foster teens
each year, helping them with their transition to independent living.277 There
are three components to this program: education and training, a special teen
unit that provides advocacy for individuals, and a resource fair that
promotes awareness among foster teens and service providers.278
KidsVoice provides training for advocates, which includes client
interviews, an overview of the relevant law, statistics about youth who age
out, and suggestions for improved advocacy.279 Members of independent
living committees train kids on how to advocate strategically regarding
housing, mental health, medical coverage, education, employment,
community resources, living skills, and permanent networks.280 KidsVoice
also created a special teen advocacy unit that helps teens by: (1) visiting
them in an environment that is convenient for them; (2) negotiating for
resources for them; (3) preparing them for court; and (4) counseling them
about available services.281
D. Post-Secondary Educational Assistance
States are obligated to provide foster youth with proper preparation for
emancipation. That should include the implementation of a program to
offer financial assistance for educational pursuits. States could determine
how the funding would be implemented, but should provide tuition and fee
waivers for wards of the court.282 In addition, living expense subsidies
should be provided for full-time students. The waivers should cover youth
until the age of twenty-four, to give some leeway for foster youth who were

276

See Hollander, supra note 18, at 447 (describing the services and resources
provided by an Independent Living Committee in Pennsylvania).
277
Id. at 444 (recognizing KidsVoice as an organization that works to help foster
youth who age out of the system to successfully transition to adulthood).
278
Id. at 447 (describing the components of the Independent Living Committee
program used to assist foster youth).
279
Id. (training for KidsVoice staff designed to assist staff in advocating for teen
clients both in and out of court).
280
Id. at 447-48 (targeting areas of concern in advocating for clients approaching
their eighteenth birthday).
281
Id. at 448 (advocating for almost 200 teen clients in one of the most economically
disadvantaged areas of Allegheny County, the Monongahela Valley).
282
See Benedetto, supra note 27, at 407 (explaining states that do not currently offer
an education assistance program should consider implementing such a program
adopting certain aspects of the Massachusetts model).
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not able to gain access to college immediately after high school.283 Foster
youth could contribute to their education by paying for a portion of the
tuition, the funding of which could be obtained if the youth participates in
work-study.284 As the former foster youth gains valuable education, she
will be better able to maintain economic stability, which will decrease
government costs.
E. Employer Partnerships and Subsidies
Finding employment is particularly difficult for foster youth because
they do not have job experience or interviewing skills. To help,
caseworkers can form a partnership with employment agencies in order to
gather information regarding job openings. The employment agency could
communicate with specific employers and provide incentives for hiring
foster youth in the form of employment subsidies. 285 The subsidies would
work by providing a monetary benefit to employers for hiring foster
youth.286
Opponents of this suggestion argue that foster youth may grow to
depend on the subsidies and have a difficult time finding work on their
own. In order to prevent this from occurring, the subsidies could be
provided on a limited basis. The subsidies will not only provide foster
youth with a “foot in the door,” but they will also send a message to the
public that it is important to involve foster youth in the workforce.
PART IX: CONCLUSION
Foster youth in state custody have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process right to treatment and a right to be free from harm, which
includes the provision of pre-emancipation preparation and after care
services. The right to treatment and safety should be expressed in the form
of training, which should include access to support systems and educational
and employment opportunities. Foster youth should have these rights
regardless of whether they are in the state’s custody voluntarily or
involuntarily. In addition, foster youth are not like prisoners and should
not be treated as such. The courts should apply the professional judgment

283

Id. at 407 (describing important aspects of a Former Foster Youth Education
Assistance Program).
284
Id. at 408 (explaining the importance of work-study in a Former Foster Youth
Education Assistance Program because it places former foster youth students on equal
footing with their fellow students and allows former foster youth to obtain work
experience and professional contacts).
285
See Benedetto, supra note 56, at 422.
286
See id.
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standard rather than the deliberate indifference standard when determining
liability of state actors who have failed in their obligations to care for the
needs of the youth they serve. Furthermore, the Supreme Court should
clearly establish these rights and standards so they are specific to foster
youth.
The high rates of unemployment, low educational achievement, poverty,
and criminal activity that pervade the lives of foster youth after they age
out of foster care are often caused by a lack of preparation for
emancipation, which the state is obligated to provide. The failure to
provide these services causes harm, and while the harm does not
necessarily manifest while the youth is in foster care, it exhibits once the
youth has left the system. Failing to provide foster youth with the
necessary skills for independent living creates lasting harm, and it is
imperative that the courts work to prevent the harm by requiring that state
actors provide emancipation preparation training for foster youth.

